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AN ArFACK ON THE "TWENTY-ONE YEAR RULE"
By S. RAYMOND DUNN*
The rule against perpetuities has been defined by Gray
in one sentence:
"No interest.., is good unless it must vest, if at all,
not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest."'
The rule has been criticized in the following language:
"It was all very well to consider that manhood had
been attained by a tough-fibred youth of twenty-one
when the chief duties of a man were to wield a sword,
wear a tin suit, collect feudal dues from the tenantry
and torture gold out of the usurers, but it hardly fol-
lows that a Junior in college is competent to handle
investment problems in a world of Coolidge booms,
Hoover depressions, Roosevelt recessions and a planned
economy."'
The mind of the average person of twenty-one is not
focused upon the studies which are essential to the sound
management of investments. Inflation, deflation, current
ratios, price-earnings ratios, convertibility features of
bonds, debentures and preferred stock, seasonal and cycli-
cal fluctuations, long-term growth trends are not within the
range of interests of the average youth of twenty-one,
whose tastes are often more likely to run to rock-and-roll.
Persons under twenty-five customarily pay higher
premiums for automobile liability insurance, and this sup-
plies actuarial proof, if proof be needed, of a certain reck-
lessness. As a rule, a higher degree of discretion is required
in portfolio and real estate management than in the driv-
ing of an automobile.
Even a few generations ago, persons aged twenty-one,
having attained physical maturity, were able to cope ade-
quately with most of the problems of life, e.g., making a
clearing in the forest, building a log cabin, planting seed.
But it is a far cry from seed to sinking funds. The ever
* Of the Baltimore City Bar, A.B., Johns Hopkins University, 1933, LL.B.,
University of Maryland School of Law, 1938.
'GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PEnRPrrmTxES (4th Ed., 1942) 191. Italics
added.
2 Leach, The Rule against Perpetuitie8 and Gifts to Classes, 51 Harv. L.
Rev. 1329, 1332 (1938). Italics added.
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increasing complexities of present-day living require an in-
creased maturity.
It appears that the twenty-one year period stems from
the period during which an estate tail could be made
unbarrable8
The language of Lord Brougham, in Cole v. Sewell,4
regarding the origin of the twenty-one year rule, is quite
interesting and illuminating:
"And as I had often heard ventilated the notion that
there could be no such thing as a term in gross, at all,
of twenty-one years, I put the question expressly to
the learned Judges. .. namely, can there, without the
least regard being had to the fact out of which the rule
arose (for that is the origin of the rule), without the
least regard being had to the fact of the heir of A, the
life or last of the lives in being, not being able to cut
off or to bar the remainder, by suffering a recovery or
levying a fine, till he is twenty-one, - without any re-
gard to that, but supposing there to be no question of
the heir at all; supposing there to be no question of
levying a fine or suffering a recovery, or barring the
remainder over at all, can by law the life or lives in
being have the addition of a term in gross of twenty-
one years? The Judges held that that is now the law,
whatever may have been its origin. It most clearly
arises from a mistake. The law never meant to give a
further term of twenty-one years, much less any period
of gestation. The law never meant to say that there
shall be twenty-one years added to the life or lives in
being, and that within those limits you may entail the
estate, but what the law meant to say was this: until
the heir of the last of the lives in being attains twenty-
one, by law a recovery cannot be suffered, and conse-
quently the discontinuance of the estate cannot be
effected, and for that reason, says the law, you shall
have the twenty-one years added, because that is the
fact and not the law, namely, that till a person reached
the age of twenty-one, he could not cut off the entail."
We are not concerned with the concept of the term in
gross, as such. Assuming, however, as we must inevitably
assume, that the term in gross has been firmly established
8SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1951) 365; Stephens v. Stephens, Cas. T.
Talb. 228, 25 Eng. Rep. 751 (1736) ; Cole v. Sewell, 2 H. L. Cas. 186, 233,
9 Eng. Rep. 1062 (1848).
£ Ibid, 232-233, 1080-81. Italics added.
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in the law, why should the term in gross necessarily be one
of twenty-one years?
The following conclusions spring from Lord Brougham's
language: The twenty-one year term arose out of a fact
and not the law. The fact was then the inability of a per-
son under the age of twenty-one to cut off the entail. The
equivalent fact is now the attainment of the age at which
the average, prudent man is able to manage investments
intelligently. Factual ability is the substance. Age twenty-
one is the mere form. And that form is now out-of-date.
It is, indeed, the common experience of trust companies
and of estate planners generally to find that one of the
major concerns of clients is to have the estate protected
against dissipation or destruction through final distribution
at too early an age.
Consequently, in situations where the rule against per-
petuities is not involved (e.g. in cases relating to trusts for
the testator's own children), it is customary to have distri-
butions at such ages as twenty-five, thirty or thirty-five.
Why then should the fundamental estate plan or scheme
have to run the risk of being defeated by premature dis-
tribution to grandchildren?
Clearly, the result is the same in either case: the testa-
tor's intent is defeated, by payments into juvenile hands,
whether those hands be those of children or of grand-
children.
Moreover, since the matter is one of fact (fact which
the law should faithfully reflect) it is pertinent to con-
sider, in addition to the practical facts of investments,
estate management and actuarial figures, other facts which
are equally pertinent and compelling - medical facts, vital
statistics.
In the middle ages, the average life span was approxi-
mately forty years. At present, the average life span is
approximately sixty-five. Consequently, the twenty-one
year term was more than half of the average medieval life
span. On the other hand, a term as long as thirty years
would be less than half of the present life span. This vital
ratio is one of the facts which the law should reflect.
The contemporary (and rapidly increasing) life span
offers far greater life potentialities. A longer preparatory
period (factually a net gain, as we have seen) is the con-
comitant. If we are to reap the benefits of the potentialities,
we must have a realistic regard for the preparatory period.
Fortunately, the courts, in dealing with the rule against
perpetuities, have often retained and displayed quite a bit
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of the appropriate regard for facts, even to the extent of
modifying the rule, in order to conform to the facts.
For example, in Safe Deposit & Trust Company v.
Sheehan,5 the Court of Appeals stated:
"The rule against perpetuities is judge made law.
In its modern form it was first announced in the Duke
of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 27, which marked a defi-
nite stage in a long struggle between the great land-
owners of England who sought the power to so tie up
their land that no future owner 'would have complete
power of alienation,' and the courts, which sought to
preserve freedom of alienation as a principle of the
common law, a struggle which raged intermittently
from a very early period of the common law until com-
paratively modern times. Holdsworth, History of Eng-
lish Law, vol. 7, p. 195 et seq. But as the dangers in-
herent in the recognition of a power to withdraw prop-
erty from commerce for remote and indefinite periods
lessened, so the attitude of the courts to the right of
donors to impose restraints upon alienation in order to
protect objects of the donor's solicitude or interest
changed, and greater weight was given to the donor's
intention, so long as the execution of that intention
involved no real danger of a perpetuity. So, while
formerly the test was the period for which the estate
might endure beyond a life or lives in being and
twenty-one years (with an allowance for the period of
gestation, when necessary), the test now universally
recognized is whether it will vest within that period.
Id., 216, Miller, Construction of Wills, sec. 314 et seq.;
Tiffany on Real Property, sec. 179."
A similarly factual study and analysis of the twenty-one
year term in its present-day setting would be appropriate.
This judicial tendency to look behind mere forms, at
the facts behind the forms, has appeared quite frequently,
in many types of situations.
For example, facts which exist as of the time of the
creation of the instrument may aid in sustaining a limita-
tion. Thus, assume a devise "to such children of B as attain
the age of thirty years." This would ordinarily violate the
rule (because B could outlive the testator and subsequently
have a posthumous child, or a child born near the close of
B's life, and such child's attainment of the age of thirty
'169 Md. 93, 103-104, 179 A. 536 (1935).
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years would be beyond the permitted period). But, now,
let us suppose, also, that B died before the testator. Under
such facts, the devise is good, because, at the testator's
death, we know that the interest will vest, if it vests at all,
in children of B alive at that time.'
Facts regarding a power to revoke an inter vivos trust
instrument have also been considered and utilized by the
court to sustain what otherwise would have been an invalid
limitation. Because of such power, the settlor could re-
voke and sell the property just as certainly as if he were
the absolute owner; therefore, the property was not taken
out of commerce.7
An extensive exception to the general doctrine of the
rule against perpetuities has been carved out, on the basis
of factual circumstances, by the Court of Appeals in Hol-
lander v. Central Metal Co."
As part of the general rule, options are void if for a
longer period than twenty-one years.' Nevertheless, options
to redeem (as well as to renew) ground rent leases were
held, in the Hollander case, to be outside of the rule, be-
cause of the facts concerning real estate market conditions
in Baltimore and vicinity.
The Court stated:' 0
"Again, in the case of Myers v. Silljacks, 58 Md. 319,
speaking of leases of this character, Judge Alvey said:
'We all know that estates dependent upon leases like
the one before us are exceedingly common in this State,
and particularly so in the City of Baltimore. Both the
reversionary freehold and the leasehold estates are the
subject of daily transfers and assignments, and they
constitute a considerable portion of the substantial
wealth of the people. While the one estate is subject
exclusively to the law that governs real property, the
other is mainly controlled by the law that governs per-
sonalty; . . .Both estates alike are the subjects of
mortgage and judgment liens, and are constantly being
Siiims, op. cit., supra, n. 3, 374, citing Equitable Trust Co. v. McComb,
19 Del. Ch. 387, 168 A. 203 (1933) ; Safe Deposit and Tr. Co. v. Sheehan.
ibid; Bradford v. Griffin, 40 S. C. 468, 19 S. E. 76 (1894) ; Whitby v. Von
Luedecke, 1 Ch. 783 (1906) ; Southern v. Wollaston, 16 Beav. 276, 51 Eng.
Rep. 785 (1852).
1Mfgrs. Co. v. von Hamm-Young Co., 34 Hawaii 288 (1937).
8109 Md. 131, 71 A. 442 (1908).
'Brown v. Mathis, 201 Ga. 740, 41 S. E. 2d 137 (1947) ; Eastman Marble
Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N. E. 177 (1920) ; West Vir-
ginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. 2d 46 (1947).
10 Supra, n. 8, 160-161.
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sold and transferred in the enforcement of such
charges. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that
the tenure be maintained with entire certainty; that
the true relation of the parties to the property be at
all times fully recognized, so that their exact rights
may be known and enforced, and that third parties
may know how to deal with respect to those rights'.
And again, in the case of Worthington v. Lee, supra,11
the Court said, that the above cases fully state the
reasons why this Court 'has applied a more liberal doc-
trine to these cases than that applied in the English
Courts; and it has done so with special reference to
the peculiar nature and condition of the local titles that
exist in the City of Baltimore'. Without detracting
from the great weight and respect to which the authori-
ties cited by appellants are justly entitled,12 we must
adhere to the previous decisions of this Court, and hold
that the lease in question did not place the property
extra commercium, and that the rights of the parties
under the covenants therein are 'not open to any of
the objections against perpetuities'."
It is, perhaps., relevant to observe that the nature and
condition of the investment market throughout Maryland,
and the United States generally, are as deserving of con-
sideration as the nature and condition of the local titles and
real estate market in the City of Baltimore.
It is submitted that the twenty-one year term, rooted
in what is essentially a transatlantic and medieval system
of estates in fee tail, is now inappropriate and unrealistic
in present-day Maryland, as well as the United States
generally.
Here in Maryland, it was provided by statute, very
shortly after the Revolution, in 1782, that estates tail could
be barred by deed.13 In 1786, another statute provided that
they would also descend in fee simple. By the construction
placed upon these statutes, estates tail general were con-
verted into estates in fee simple, and it was held that a
tenant in tail general had all the rights and powers of a
tenant in fee simple, including the power to devise.4
Finally, in 1916, we got around to ending estates tail
1"61 Md. 50 (1884). Italics added.
'2They include 'GRAy, THE RULE AoAiNST PERPEruIIES (2d Ed.) §§230A,
275, 275A, cited In Appellants Brief, p. 11, and §230b quoted by the Court
of Appeals at p. 158.
18 Md. Code (1951) Art. 21, §30.
"VENABLE, REAL PoRPRTY (1892) 16.
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special.15 Yet, the fee tail's little brother, the equally quaint
and medieval twenty-one year rule, we still have with us!
Would it not appear that it is high time for the twenty-
one year rule to go the way of the fine and the common
recovery?
However, as soon as we approach the problem, we run
into the danger of being caught in a vicious circle.
Let us consider, for example, the following, somewhat
typical, "twenty-one year provision", quoted by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals in a recent decision:"
"(c) From and after twenty-one years after the
death of the last surviving descendant of Mary Eliza-
beth Devries living at the time of my death, or upon
the youngest living grandchild of Mary Elizabeth
Devries attaining the age of twenty-one years, which-
ever event shall first occur, I hereby give the trust
estate as then constituted, including accrued interest
not matured, unto the children of Mary Elizabeth
Devries then living."
Certainly, no lawyer would deliberately prepare a will
or an inter vivos deed of trust, and substitute therein, say,
twenty-five or thirty years, in lieu of the deeply-rooted
twenty-one, thereby jeopardizing his client's estate plan,
solely for the purpose of providing the raw materials for
a test case, which might take place within a century follow-
ing "the creation of the interest".
The rule against perpetuities is already frightening
enough to many lawyers, and there are enough dangers of
subtle nature - such as the Fertile Octogenarian and the
Unborn Widow 7 - without running such obvious and un-
necessary risks.
On the other hand, it is altogether unlikely that any
appellate court would volunteer to recommend, or even to
suggest, that a term in gross for any period in excess of
tmMd. Code (1951) Art. 46, §1.
"Marty v. First Nat'l. Bk. of Balto., 209 Md. 210, 214-215, 120 A. 2d 841
(1956). Italics added. Many a will has been criticized as inartificial, but
even a casual reading of the Tormey will makes it apparent that in concept
and execution, it is highly artificial. Its language requires the inference
that the testator dealt with the possibility in law that a sister might have
a child after his death who in turn might have a child after the death of
-the sister, and that such a grandchild of the sister might not become
twenty-one until more than twenty-one years after the death of the last
descendant of that sister, who was living at the testator's death. If such
an eventuality occurred, the rule against perpetuities would have been
violated absent the cut-off clause. MILLER, CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS (1927),
936, n. 12; GAY, THE RULE AGAINST PEu'svuIwIEs (4th Ed. 1942), §110.1,
ibid, at 218.
17 Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A. 2d 672 (1944).
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twenty-one years (in addition to the life or lives in being -
plus, of course, the possible period or periods of gestation)
be provided for in some subsequently drafted instrument.
Such is not the practice of appellate courts, and, moreover,
a statement of this nature would, almost certainly, be con-
sidered as mere dictum and would not be relied upon by
draftsmen.
In short, the vicious circle (which applies to individual
gifts at least) may be described as follows: Where there
is no provision for a period in gross for more than twenty-
one years, there is nothing for a court to pass upon; and
it is practically inconceivable that a court would or could
say anything by way of dictum, strong enough to "encour-
age" the drafting of such an instrument.
Does this mean that it is almost impossible to return to
the original, practical, factual purpose of the twenty-one
year requirement? (We say "almost impossible" because
of the slight possibility that a case involving an inexpertly
drafted instrument would provide an opportunity for a
direct ruling, even with reference to an individual gift.)
Not necessarily! The law is not so inelastic. The law
offers a range of interesting possibilities and opportunities.There exists the possibility that a court might pass
favorably upon Professor Leach's recommendation"8 that
Leake v. Robinson"9 be declared analytically unsound.
Professor Leach suggested a three-pronged attack upon
Leake v. Robinson; but the same result might possibly be
accomplished by changing the period itself in a case in-
volving a class gift.
Other possibilities are afforded by statutes concerning
perpetuities, and also the closely related rule against ac-
cumulations (to which latter rule the arguments advanced
in this article are equally applicable).
Every amendment of the contemplated nature would be
helpful toward making bench, bar, estate planners, trustees
and the public increasingly "twenty-five year conscious"
Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuitie8 and Giftt to Classe, 51 Harv. L.
Rev. 1329, 1352 (1988).
10 1 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1817), holding that if there is any possi-
bility that a class gift will not vest in any possible member of the class
within the period of the rule, the entire gift is void. Of. Vickery v. Maryland
Trust Co., 188 Md. 178, 185, 52 A. 2d 100 (1947).
"Gray states (§370, p. 392) : 'A devise to the testator's grandchildren
as a class is good if the vesting is not postponed to a time after they
become of age, for they must all become of age within 21 years after the
death of their parents (the testator's children), and the parents must
all have been born (or begotten) in the testator's lifetime. What is true
of a devise to grandchildren of the testator is true also of a devise to
grandchildren of a person who has died before the testator'."
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or "thirty-year conscious", instead of "twenty-one year
conscious".
Organizations, such as the Trust Division of the Ameri-
can Banking Association, the Corporation Fiduciary Asso-
ciation and the various estate planning councils would, it
is believed, be serving the general public interest, as well
as the interests of their members and members' customers
and clients, by the urging of appropriate action.
Statutes concerning perpetuities may be classified under
three heads: 20
(1) statutes which present a general rule, distinct
from the common law rule, but with the same
general objective;
(2) statutes and constitutional provisions, merely
declaratory of the common law; and
(3) statutes which recognize the common law rule,
but which modify or supplement it in one or
more particulars.
Most important of the first group are the New York
statutes2' restricting the suspension of the power of aliena-
tion to a period of two lives, with the addition, in certain
cases, of a minority, which statutes have been adopted, in
whole or in part, by a number of other states.
As an example of the second group, an Iowa statute22
provides:
"Every disposition of property is void which sus-
pends the absolute power of controlling the same, for
a longer period than during the lives of persons then in
being, and twenty-one years thereafter."
Of particular interest is the statutory law of Wisconsin,"
which provides for a period of lives in being plus thirty
years.
With reference to accumulations, statutes, such as those
of New York,24 limit accumulations to the minority of the
20 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1951) 412.
2 REA PPRORY LAW, §42, adopted in 1909; PERSONAL PnoPETy LAW, §11.
2 IOWA CODE (1950) §558.68.
WIS. STAT. (1955) §§230.14, 230.15 and 230.23. §230.15 says:
"Limit of suspension. The absolute power of alienation shall not be
suspended by any limitation or condition whatever for a longer period
than during the continuance of a life or lives in being at the creation
of the estates and thirty years thereafter, .... "
14REAL PROPERTY LAW, §§61, 61a, 62 and 63; PEMSONAL PROPERTY LAW,
§§16, 17 and 17a.
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beneficiary, subject to various exceptions. Other states have
statutes providing for a period of accumulations which
is the same as that for the suspension of the power of
alienation. 21
In any event, the period of the "financial minority",
"investment minority" - call it what you will - could
appropriately be extended to twenty-five or thirty years.
Following the passage of several statutory amendments
with reference to the period of accumulations, as well as
the rule against perpetuities itself, in statutory jurisdic-
tions, statutory enactments - changing the period from
twenty-one to twenty-five or thirty years - would be facili-
tated even in "common law" jurisdictions.
In closing, we may appropriately recall the well-known
statement of the very creator of the rule against perpetui-
ties, Lord Nottingham, when he was asked where he would
stop if he did not stop at a life in being as the maximum
period: "I will stop whenever inconvenience doth appear".
For the many reasons considered, the term of twenty-
one years after some life in being is no longer one of con-
venience, but one of inconvenience. The rationale of the
rule, as expressed by Lord Nottingham himself, requires
an additional term of twenty-five or thirty years, after
some life in being. (Clearly, for example, "inconvenience"
means the same thing for children as for grandchildren.)
Furthermore, because of the lengthening of the average
life span, the continuation of the twenty-one year term
constitutes not a maintenance of the originally contem-
plated scheme of estate planning, but rather a departure
from the original scheme. From the standpoint of physi-
ology, as well as investments, the age of thirty is today's
schematic equivalent of age twenty-one centuries ago.
In the language of Safe Deposit & Trust Company v.
Sheehan," the attitude of the courts to the right of donors
to impose restraints upon alienation should change once
again (change in form, that is, not in essence, for essentially
it would be a restoration and reinvigoration of the true
rule) in order to protect the objects of the donor's solicitude
or interest, and greater weight should once again be given
to the donor's intention, so long as the execution of that
intention involves no real danger of a perpetuity.
MONT. REV. CODE (1947) §§67-411-413, 67-416.
169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935).
